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I. INTRODUCTION
RONAUTICAL CHARTS are the only communication me-
ia ever judged by any court to be "products" and the only
communication media ever deemed subject to "strict product
liability."' That is, while publishers may be held strictly liable for
* Author is a shareholder in the law firm of Rossi & Maricle P.C., in Denver,
Colorado, and has specialized in the areas of aviation and insurance litigation for
sixteen years. He received his B.S. in Physics from Antioch College in 1969 and
his J.D. from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1982.
1 This conclusion is based on the author's own research as of this date. But
numerous courts have considered and rejected publisher liability for defective
ideas and information. SeeJones v.J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217-
18 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
does not extend to dissemination of an idea or knowledge in case where nursing
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publishing certain harmful and damaging information, such as
defamatory falsehoods regarding private persons or publications
that infringe a copyrighted work, such publications were never
considered products subject to strict product liability. This
unique legal status accorded aeronautical charts will be ex-
amined to determine whether aeronautical chart publishers
should have the same legal protections afforded other
publishers.2
II. STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY
The modern form of strict product liability was first enunci-
ated by the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc. in 1962.' Before Greenman, strict product liability
existed as express and implied warranty. 4 After briefly noting
the evolution of strict product liability from contract warranty to
tort, the California Supreme Court ruled that "[t] o establish the
manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that
he was injured while using the [product] in a way it was in-
student was injured treating self with a constipation remedy listed in a nursing
textbook); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803-04 (S.D. Tex.
1983) (refusing to apply strict product liability to a case in which a person died
after imitating "autoerotic asphyxiation" described in magazine article because
the court held that contents of magazines are not within meaning of RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that a textbook was not a defective product for purposes
of product liability law because the intended use of a book is reading, and the
plaintiff was not injured by reading but by doing a science project described in
the textbook), affd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding
a book is not a product under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A in a case
where reader of Last Chance Diet book died from diet complications), affd, 587
A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991); cf Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that transmission of words is not the same as selling items
with physical properties so that when a bookseller merely passes on a book with-
out inspection, the thoughts and ideas within the book do not constitute a
"good" for the purposes of a breach of implied warranty claim under the UCC).
Publisher liability cases should not be confused with "failure to warn" cases in
which a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for failure to provide adequate
information or for providing false or misleading information in connection with
a product. In those cases, the defective product caused the harm, not the defec-
tive information.
2 It is important to note that this Article does not deal with the question of
whether aeronautical chart publishers may be held liable for publication of false
or misleading information when there is a finding of culpable conduct such as
negligence.
3 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
4 Id. at 901.
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tended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufac-
ture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the [product]
unsafe for its intended use."5 In reaching this conclusion, the
court also noted that strict product liability was first applied to
unwholesome food products and then extended to "a variety of
other products that create as great or greater hazards if defec-
tive." 6 Certainly, if information is considered a product, it is dif-
ficult to imagine anything potentially more hazardous than
defective information. Yet, to date, application of strict product
liability to publishers has been expressly rejected by every court
considering the issue, except for aeronautical chart publishers.7
Two years after Greenman, the American Law Institute adopted
strict product liability in section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.8 Today, almost every state has adopted some form of
strict product liability, either as common law or by statute. 9
The doctrine of strict product liability eliminates the plain-
tiffs need to prove the fault or culpable conduct of the defend-
ant manufacturer or seller.' 0 Under section 402A, liability is
imposed if a product that caused an injury is found to have been
unreasonably dangerous regardless of the level of care taken by
5 Id.
6 Id. at 900.
7 See supra note 1.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
9 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98,
at 694 (5th ed. 1984).
10 [T]he fact that the manufacturer took reasonable precautions in an
attempt to design a safe product or otherwise acted as a reasonably
prudent manufacturer would have under the circumstances, while
perhaps absolving the manufacturer of liability under a negligence
theory, will not preclude the imposition of liability under strict lia-
bility principles if, upon hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that
the product's design is unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders.
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978) (citations omitted).
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the manufacturer. 1 Indeed, the manufacturer's conduct may
not even be an issue in a strict product liability case.12 Accord-
ingly, imposition of strict product liability means a publisher
that is completely without fault and who took every possible pre-
caution to ensure that the information it published was accurate
and safe, may still be held liable for any injury caused by the
published information.
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
AERONAUTICAL CHARTS
Aeronautical charts convey information used by pilots in-
flight and for pre-flight planning. Among other things, charts
depict airways,'" flight procedures," navigation and communi-
cation frequencies, flight restrictions, 15 landmarks, and terrain.
One type of aeronautical chart is called an instrument approach
chart. This chart depicts instrument approach procedures-
procedures used when attempting to land by reference to the
aircraft's instruments during adverse weather conditions that
make a visual approach difficult or impossible. Because the ap-
proach to land and landing are arguably the most dangerous
parts of the flight, it is not surprising that most lawsuits against
chart publishers allege defective instrument approach charts.
By international agreement, all types of flight procedures, in-
cluding instrument approach procedures, are designed and
promulgated by each governing authority having jurisdiction
over the particular airspace. 6 In the United States, all flight
procedures are designed and promulgated by the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) and become Federal Aviation Regu-
lations (FARs).' 7 Any pilot instructed by Air Traffic Control to
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 Airways are designated routes between navigation fixes.
14 Flight procedures are generally routine instructions to navigate along a pre-
determined route for the purpose of approaching to land at an airport or depart-
ing from an airport.
15 Flight restrictions include limitations on flight over certain areas or above or
below certain altitudes.
16 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 1181, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 296 [hereinafter Chicago
Convention].
17 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 97 (1998). Section 97.20 states:
This subpart prescribes standard instrument approach procedures
based on the criteria contained in the U.S. Standard for Terminal
Instrument Approach Procedures (TERPs). The standard instru-
ment approach procedures adopted by the FAA and described on
AERONAUTICAL CHART PUBLISHERS
follow a certain instrument approach procedure must comply
with that procedure.'
Pilots are not required to carry any particular form of aero-
nautical chart, or indeed any charts at all. They are required
only to have the necessary information in whatever form is most
useful.' 9 In the electronic age, the form of the information can
vary widely. In the future it may not be unusual for a cockpit to
be completely paperless. Thus, aeronautical charts are just one
of many possible forms of communication of information to the
pilot.
IV. AERONAUTICAL CHART DEFECTS
The law of product liability deals in dangerous products, that
is, products that cause harm. If an aeronautical chart is consid-
ered to be a product, the publisher may be held strictly liable for
harm caused by defects in the chart. But publications consist of
two parts, the media itself and the information conveyed. While
a person could be injured by a defect in the media, a paper cut
for example, the issue of dangerous media defects is trivial and
will not be considered.
Logically, defective information may be categorized in one of
three groups according to whether the information is communi-
cated accurately and whether the information is dangerous.
That is, the information communicated by the chart may be (1)
FAA Form 8260-3, 8260-4, or 8260-5 are incorporated into this part
and made a part hereof as provided in 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (1) and pur-
suant to 1 C.F.R. part 20. The incorporated standard instrument
approach procedures are available for examination at the Rules
Docket and at the National Flight Data Center, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, D.C.,
20590. Copies of SLAPs adopted in a particular FAA Region are
also available for examination at the headquarters of that Region.
Moreover, copies of SIAPs originating in a particular Flight Inspec-
tion District Office are available for examination at that Office.
Based on the information contained on FAA Form 8260-3, 8260-4,
and 8260-5, standard instrument approach procedures are por-
trayed on charts prepared for the use of pilots by the U.S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey and other publishers of aeronautical charts.
Id.
18 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.123 (1998) ("When an ATC clearance has been obtained,
no pilot in command may deviate from that clearance unless an amended clear-
ance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is in response to a traffic
alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory.").
'9 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.103 (1998).
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accurate but misleading, (2) accurate but dangerous, or (3) sim-
ply inaccurate.
A chart is accurate but misleading when the information de-
picted is correct but the manner of its graphic depiction is al-
leged to have mislead the pilot into interpreting the
information incorrectly. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jep-
pesen & Co.,20 the plaintiffs alleged that an instrument approach
chart was defective because two graphic views of the instrument
approach procedure used different scales and that this discrep-
ancy caused the pilot to become confused.2 1 Instrument ap-
proach charts graphically depict instrument approach
procedures in two views, an overhead view and a side view. 22
This particular chart used a different scale for the side view than
it did for the overhead view, allegedly causing the pilot to think
that the minimum allowable altitude near the crash location was
lower than it actually was. 23 Accordingly, while all of the infor-
mation communicated by the chart was accurate and the ap-
proach procedure was otherwise safe, the chart was found to be
defective solely because it was misleading.
Another case involving an accurate but allegedly misleading
instrument approach chart was Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.24 In
that case, while maneuvering to land, the aircraft struck a hill
that was not depicted on the chart.25 The alleged defect was the
failure to depict this hill even though it was higher than nearby
terrain that was depicted. While such information is not part of
the flight procedure, terrain is often depicted on charts to en-
hance the pilot's terrain awareness. In this case, it was alleged
that the pilots believed they could descend below the minimum
altitude prescribed by the approach procedure provided they re-
mained above the highest depicted terrain. Accordingly, even
though the approach procedure was accurately depicted and
not dangerous, it was alleged that the terrain depiction and the
associated terrain legend were misleading. 26
20 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
21 See id. at 342.
22 These two views are referred to as the plan view and profile, respectively.
23 See Aetna, 642 F.2d at 342.
24 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
25 See id. at 70. The F/uor opinion contained no allegation of any defect in the
flight procedure or the manner in which it was depicted. The allegations were




The second type of defect occurs when a chart accurately de-
picts a dangerous approach procedure. In Brocklesby v. United
States, the chart was alleged to be accurate and not misleading,
but the procedure that was designed and promulgated by the
FAA was deemed dangerous because it did not provide for a
transition routing from the en route phase to the instrument
approach procedure.27 Similarly, in Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, an
accurate, non-misleading chart was alleged to be defective be-
cause the minimum descent altitude specified by the instrument
approach procedure was unsafe.28
The third type of defect, alleged in Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.,
involved an area chart rather than an instrument approach
chart.29 An area chart depicts en route information such as air-
ways rather than instrument approach procedures. This chart
was defective because it incorrectly identified an instrument ap-
proach procedure as an Instrument Landing System (ILS) 30 pro-
cedure instead of a Localizer procedure. 3' The two types of
procedures are similar except that the latter does not provide
electronic altitude guidance. It was alleged that the pilot flew
his aircraft into the ground thinking he had electronic altitude
guidance.3 2 The issue in this case was not the nature of the de-
fect, which was not in dispute, but rather causation.
These five cases are the only reported aeronautical chart cases
involving strict product liability. Moreover, a commercial pub-
lisher, Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., was the publisher defendant in
each case. There are also numerous reported cases against the
United States for defects in its published aeronautical charts.
Although the United States publishes virtually the same infor-
mation as the commercial publishers, it cannot be held strictly
liable because of sovereign immunity 3 To date, there are no
27 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985).
28 593 P.2d 924, 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
- 707 F.2d 671, 672 (2d Cir. 1983).
30 An ILS is a type of radio navigation system that provides both directional
guidance and descending altitude guidance for landing.
31 A Localizer system is similar to an ILS except that it does not provide de-
scending altitude guidance. Thus a pilot using a Localizer must descend in steps
at designated distances from the airport.
32 See Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 672-73.
33 For a more complete discussion of most reported and unreported aeronau-
tical chart cases, see generally R. Schultz, Navigation Charts on Trial: How Safe is
Safe?, J. OF NAVIGATION, Spring 1992, at 25.
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reported cases alleging strict product liability against a publisher
of aeronautical information in electronic form.3 4
V. CASES HOLDING THAT AN AERONAUTICAL CHART
IS A PRODUCT SUBJECT TO COMMON LAW
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY
Each of the four courts that ruled that aeronautical charts are
products applied the common law of the appropriate jurisdic-
tion. The first court to suggest that an aeronautical chart was a
product subject to strict product liability was an Arizona trial
court. In Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, a case arising out of the crash
of a Pan Am flight into Manila, Phillippines, the trial judge
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) for
plaintiffs after the jury returned a verdict in favor of the pub-
lisher, Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. (Jeppesen) 5 The appellate
court reversed the trial court and reinstated the jury verdict. In
granting j.n.o.v., the trial judge treated the chart as a product
and applied strict liability. The appellate court said that,
"[a]lthough we have serious misgivings about whether this is a
products liability case, we need not decide this issue because we
find that the court erred in granting judgment n.o.v. in any
event."16
The aeronautical chart as a product issue was first considered
by an appellate court in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen
& Co. 3 ' The court stated:
Jeppesen acquires this FAA form [the 8260]38 and portrays the
information therein on a graphic approach chart. This is Jep-
pesen's "product".
[The Jeppesen chart] conveys information in two ways: by words
and numbers, and by graphics....
While the information conveyed in words and figures on the Las
Vegas approach chart was completely correct, the purpose of the
34 As of this date, there is a case pending in United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida arising out of the crash of an American Airlines 757
near Cali, Colombia, wherein American Airlines contends that the information
contained in its on-board Flight Management Computer was defective and dan-
gerous. American seeks indemnification from the publishers Jeppesen Sander-
son, Inc. and Honeywell, Inc. See In reAir Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20,
1995, 985 F. Supp. 1106, 1147 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
35 593 P.2d 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
i, Id. at 927.
s7 642 F.2d 339, 34243 (9th Cir. 1981).
38 Form 8260 is used by the FAA to officially publish flight procedures. It is a
tabular textual format containing no graphics whatsoever.
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chart was to translate this information into an instantly under-
standable graphic representation. This was what gave the chart
its usefulness-this is what the chart contributed to the mere
data amassed and promulgated by the FAA. 39
The court provided no further explanation or justification for
its finding that the graphic portrayal of FAA data was a product.
It is analogous to finding that the design of a product, as op-
posed to the product, is itself a product. Furthermore, to say
that the design of the words and numbers in a publication is a
product was and remains unprecedented to this day.
The next court to consider this issue was the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.40 After correctly
stating that the "Ninth Circuit has assumed, without discussion,
that... portrayal of Federal Aviation Administration flight data
on its charts is a 'product' for strict liability purposes," this court
attempted tojustify this finding on the basis of the chart's mass
production and the publisher's ability to purchase product lia-
bility insurance." While mass production and product liability
insurance are often touted as justification for the doctrine of
strict product liability, they do not answer the question of
whether the flight data communicated on a chart is a product or
whether strict liability should apply.
Without question, the paper and chart binders produced by
chart publishers are products, but the more difficult question is
whether the information published is also a product. While the
paper and chart binders are mass produced, they are the basis
for liability. On the other hand, it is illogical to say the informa-
tion that is the basis for liability is also mass produced. Only the
media is mass produced, not the message. Indeed, in Aetna, the
Ninth Circuit found only that the translation of the words and
numbers into graphics was a product, not the information com-
municated, at least not yet.42
The Second Circuit also failed to mention that the Saloomey
case involved neither the same type of chart, nor the same cate-
gory of error as the Aetna case. Saloomey involved an alleged er-
ror on an area chart, a publication that depicts airways, not
instrument approach procedures. Even though area charts are
entirely different than the approach charts discussed in Aetna,
39 Aetna, 642 F.2d at 342.
4o 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
41 Id. at 676-77.
42 Aetna, 642 F.2d at 342.
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the Second Circuit made no attempt to justify the imposition of
strict liability on such charts. Moreover, in Aetna, plaintiffs al-
leged that the graphic depiction, Jeppesen's "product," was mis-
leading. In Saloomey, as noted earlier, there was an actual error
in the information on the chart. That is, it was alleged thatJep-
pesen incorrectly labeled an airport as having a full Instrument
Landing System, labeled as "ILS" on the chart, when in fact it
had only the more limited Localizer System that should have
been labeled "LOC." The opinion does not explain the error's
origin.
In Brocklesby v. United States, the Ninth Circuit took strict liabil-
ity for approach charts a giant step further in finding that the
information communicated was a "component" of the approach
chart, making the publisher liable without fault for accurate de-
piction of a defective approach procedure.4" Apparently, the
court "forgot" its previous holding in Aetna that the translation
of the words and numbers of the FAA's approach procedure
from tabular form to graphic form was Jeppesen's "product,"
not the raw data.44 The court said that "[t] he issue is whether
Jeppesen's chart is a product, not whether the instrument ap-
proach procedure is a product."45
There is no dispute that a chart is a product. It is a mass pro-
duced, tangible item. But that was not the issue. The issue was
whether information communicated by a chart is a product.
More to the point, can a publisher be held liable for accurately
communicating "defective" information? This is where the
Ninth Circuit's logic collapsed. The court proclaimed that the
information conveyed is a component part of a communica-
tion.46 Thus, it concluded, if a party is strictly liable for inaccu-
rate communication, it must also be strictly liable for accurate
communication of "defective" information because a manufac-
turer is strictly liable for any defects in component parts.4" The
court instructed:
The manufacturer of a product is strictly liable for defects in that
product even though the defect can be traced to a component
part supplied by another. Thus if you find thatJeppesen's instru-
ment approach chart is defective and that the defect was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident, you must findJeppesen liable even if
43 767 F.2d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1985).
44 Aetna, 642 F.2d at 342.
45 Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1294.




the defect exists only because you find that the F.A.A. designed
an approach procedure that you find is itself defective.48
The Ninth Circuit apparently felt the need to rationalize its
imposition of strict liability on an otherwise innocent aeronauti-
cal chart publisher. Three 'justifications" were given: (1) the
publisher has the ability to detect an error and a mechanism for
seeking corrections; (2) the publisher has the right to seek in-
demnification from the government; and (3) in this case, the
publisher, Jeppesen, advertised that its charts were complete in
every detail.49
With respect to the first justification, the court said '"eppesen
had both the ability to detect an error and a mechanism for
seeking corrections. Under these circumstances, we reject Jep-
pesen's argument that the Government's procedure was com-
pletely beyond Jeppesens control."5 °
Instrument approach procedures, like most government regu-
lations, are promulgated after notice and comment. This is the
so-called mechanism for seeking corrections mentioned by the
court. Jeppesen's so-called "mechanism for seeking correc-
tions," therefore, is the same mechanism that every citizen has
to comment on government regulations before they go into ef-
fect. Presumably, in a case involving an instrument approach
procedure promulgated by another country when the publisher
lacked a mechanism for seeking corrections, imposition of strict
product liability would not be justified on this basis.
The court further justified its position by saying that, "[t] o the
extent thatJeppesen is held liable for the Government's misfea-
sance, Jeppesen had a right to seek tort law indemnification.
But two years later the same court found that the Government
could not be sued for exercising its discretionary authority in
designing instrument procedures.52  Ironically, the United
States, which published the same "defective" instrument ap-
proach chart for which Jeppesen was held liable in Brocklesby,
would have been immune from liability despite the fact that it
not only published the procedure, but designed it also.5"
48 Id. at 1295.
49 See id. at 1296-98.
50 Id. at 1296.
51 Id. at 1296-97.
52 See West v. F.A.A., 830 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1987).
53 Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1291-92 ("The [FAA] designs and publishes standard
instrument approach procedures."). Most aeronautical charts used in the United
States are published and sold by both an agency of the U.S. government and
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Inexplicably, the court added that if the publisher merely
published the original text form of the approach procedure, it
would be immune from strict liability.54 But the act of con-
verting the text form to graphics somehow subjected the pub-
lisher to liability, not only for its form 55 but also for defects in
the procedure itself.56 The court does notjustify this added bur-
den by any policy argument. Rather, it appears to be based
solely on the publisher's own advertising. The court quoted
from its catalog, circa 1973, that stated:
When pilots compare approach plates .. .for information, for
readability ... they choose Jeppesen. Why? Because the format
of Jeppesen charts was designed by pilots, for pilots, and has
been time-tested and proven by instrument pilots throughout the
world. Every necessary detail is clearly indicated....
Jeppesen approach plates include ... EVERYTHING you need
for a smooth transition from enroute to approach segment of
your flight.
57
The court went on to say that "[i]t is true that the govern-
ment's procedures are significant components of Jeppesen's
charts. It is apparent, however, thatJeppesen's charts are more
than mere republication of the government's procedures. In-
deed, Jeppesen's charts are distinct products." '58
According to the Ninth Circuit, reformatting government reg-
ulations to make them more readable and advertising that fact
subjects the publisher to strict liability, not only for the manner
in which it makes the regulation more readable, but also for
defects in the government regulations themselves.59 After the
Brocklesby decision, the publisher removed the offending words
quoted by the Ninth Circuit from its catalog. Presumably, in a
future case, at least this justification for strict product liability is
no longer applicable.
Jeppesen, a private commercial publisher. If the pilots had purchased and used
the government published chart instead of the privately published chart, sover-
eign immunity would have precluded the plaintiffs from suing the government
for strict product liability. That is, the Federal Tort Claims Act, which provides a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity, does not allow for strict liability. See 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
54 See Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1297-98.
55 See Aetna Cas. and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir.
1981).
56 See Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1298.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 1298.
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Shortly after the Brocklesby opinion, a California appellate
court also found that strict product liability applied to alleged
defects in an instrument approach chart. In Fluor Corp. v. Jep-
pesen & Co., the plaintiffs alleged that the chart failed to depict
the highest terrain in the vicinity of the airport.6 ° Terrain infor-
mation is neither regulatory nor even required for the purpose
of an instrument approach procedure. It is printed on instru-
ment approach charts solely for the purpose of enhancing the
pilot's terrain awareness. In an unabashedly result oriented de-
cision, this court said:
[T] he policy reasons underlying the strict products liability con-
cept should be considered in determining whether something is
a product within the meaning of its use .. .rather than .. .to
focus in the dictionary definition of the word.
When so viewed, characterizing [Jeppesen's] instrument ap-
proach charts as "products" serves "'l[T]he paramount policy to
be promoted by the [doctrine],"' i.e., "'The protection of other-
wise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spread-
ing throughout society of the cost of compensating them."' 61
The F/uor trial court refused to apply strict liability, explaining
that "strict liability principles are applicable only to items whose
physical properties render them innately dangerous."62 The ap-
pellate court disagreed, stating:
[A] lthough a sheet of paper might not be dangerous, per se, it
would be difficult indeed to conceive of a salable commodity
with more inherent lethal potential than an aid to aircraft naviga-
tion that, contrary to its own design standards, fails to list the
highest land mass immediately surrounding a landing site.63
In other words, the F/uor court found that strict liability ap-
plied to protect defenseless victims and because of the perceived
lethal potential of errors-that is, the ends justify the means.
Charts are deemed products so that victims will be compensated
and because they are dangerous. But it would be difficult to
imagine a more dangerous commodity, or one that affects more
defenseless victims, than information and ideas.
Six years later, in 1991, the Ninth Circuit missed an opportu-
nity to change its Brocklesby decision. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam's
- 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
61 Id. at 71 (quoting Lowrie v. City Evanston, 365 N.E.2d 923, 928 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977) and Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 230 (Cal. 1982) (ci-
tations omitted)).
62 Id. at 71.
63 Id. at 71-72.
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Sons, 64 the court considered whether to impose liability on the
publisher of a book titled The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms for alleg-
edly publishing erroneous and misleading information concern-
ing the identification of the most deadly species of mushrooms.
The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that "1) the in-
formation contained in a book is not a product for the purposes
of strict liability under products liability law; and 2) . . . a pub-
lisher does not have a duty to investigate the accuracy of the text
it publishes.165 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
stated:
A book containing Shakespeare's sonnets consists of two parts,
the material and print therein, and the ideas and expression
thereof. The first may be a product, but the second is not. The
latter, were Shakespeare alive, would be governed by copyright
laws; the laws of libel, to the extent consistent with the First
Amendment; and the laws of misrepresentation, negligent mis-
representation, negligence, and mistake. These doctrines appli-
cable to the second part are aimed at the delicate issues that arise
with respect to intangibles such as ideas and expression. Prod-
ucts liability law is geared to the tangible world.66
Contrary to the Fluor decision, the court said:
The language of products liability law reflects its focus on tangi-
ble items. In describing the scope of products liability law, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts lists examples of items that are
covered. All of these are tangible items, such as tires,
automobiles, and insecticides. The American Law Institute
clearly was concerned with including all physical items but gave
no indication that the doctrine should be expanded beyond that
area.
The purposes served by products liability law also are focused on
the tangible world and do not take into consideration the unique
characteristics of ideas and expression. Under products liability
law, strict liability is imposed on the theory that "[t]he costs of
damaging events due to defectively dangerous products can best
be borne by the enterprises who make and sell these products."
Strict liability principles have been adopted to further the "cause
of accident prevention . . . [by] the elimination of the necessity
of proving negligence." Additionally, because of the difficulty of
establishing fault or negligence in products liability cases, strict
liability is the appropriate legal theory to hold manufacturers lia-
ble for defective products. Thus, the seller is subject to liability
"even though he has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
64 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1034.
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tion and sale of the product." It is not a question of fault but
simply a determination of how society wishes to assess certain
costs that arise from the creation and distribution of products in
a complex technological society in which the consumer thereof is
unable to protect himself against certain product defects.
Although there is always some appeal to the involuntary spread-
ing of costs of injuries in any area, the costs in any comprehen-
sive cost/benefit analysis would be quite different were strict
liability concepts applied to words and ideas. We place a high
priority on the unfettered exchange of ideas. We accept the risk
that words and ideas have wings we cannot clip and which carry
them we know not where. The threat of liability without fault
(financial responsibility for our words and ideas in the absence
of fault or a special undertaking or responsibility) could seriously
inhibit those who wish to share thoughts and theories. As a New
York court commented, with the specter of strict liability,
"[w] ould any author wish to be exposed ... for writing on a topic
which might result in physical injury? e.g. How to cut trees; How
to keep bees?" One might add: "Would anyone undertake to
guide by ideas expressed in words either a discrete group, a na-
tion, or humanity in general?"
Strict liability principles even when applied to products are not
without their costs. Innovation may be inhibited. We tolerate
these losses. They are much less disturbing than the prospect
that we might be deprived of the latest ideas and theories.67
Upon reading these eloquent words, one would believe that
the Ninth Circuit reversed its previous ruling regarding strict lia-
bility for approach charts. That would be wrong. The court ex-
pressly considered and rejected the plaintiffs argument that
strict liability should be imposed on the publisher of The Encyclo-
pedia of Mushrooms for the same policy reasons that had been
applied to approach charts:
Several jurisdictions have held that charts which graphically de-
pict geographic features or instrument approach information for
airplanes are "products" for the purpose of products liability
law.... Plaintiffs suggest that The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms can
be compared to aeronautical charts because both items contain
representations of natural features and both are intended to be
used while engaging in a hazardous activity. We are not
persuaded.
Aeronautical charts are highly technical tools. They are graphic
depictions of technical, mechanical data. The best analogy to an
aeronautical chart is a compass. Both may be used to guide an
67 Id. at 1034-35 (citations omitted).
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individual who is engaged in an activity requiring certain knowl-
edge of natural features. Computer software that fails to yield
the result for which it was designed may be another. In contrast,
The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms is like a book on how to use a com-
pass or an aeronautical chart. The chart itself is like a physical
"product" while the "How to Use" book is pure thought and
expression.
Given these considerations, we decline to expand products liabil-
ity law to embrace the ideas and expression in a book. We know
of no court that has chosen the path to which the plaintiffs
point.68
It is difficult to understand the Ninth Circuit's distinction be-
tween a book about mushrooms and a book of aeronautical
charts. Both communicate information. Both may be used by
persons engaged in an activity, such as, finding and cooking
mushrooms, pre-flight planning, and flying. Both are original
expressions of information and ideas. Moreover, a book of aero-
nautical charts is no more like a compass than a book of mush-
rooms is like a pot. Just as a cook needs a pot to cook
mushrooms, a pilot needs a compass to fly an instrument ap-
proach procedure. Although both an aeronautical chart and a
compass-and a book about mushrooms for that matter-con-
vey information, no one would suggest that the information con-
veyed by the compass, magnetic directions, is a component of
the compass.
The Ninth Circuit's other analogy to computer software 69
would have been more useful had the court distinguished be-
tween data and computer programs. The court referred to com-
puter program software, that is, the instructions that run the
computer. Computer program software, used only to run com-
puters, is very similar to hardware and is an integral part of all
modern day computer applications. Data software, however, is
not only used by computers. Rather, it is merely a different me-
dia for information that would otherwise be published in books
or on paper. Today, everyone is familiar with books published
on CD-ROM, for example. Even The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms
could be published on CD-ROM and would be considered
software. Yet no one would distinguish between the book ver-
sion and the CD-ROM version for purposes of liability. Simi-
larly, aeronautical charts published on CD-ROM and other
68 Id. at 1035-36 (emphasis added).




electronic media should be treated no differently than their
printed counterparts.
The Ninth Circuit never defined the metaphysical concept of
"pure thought and expression," but in the age of technology, a
simple test will distinguish where a product ends and where
"pure thought and expression" begins. Anything that can be
photocopied, photographed, filmed, or electronically dupli-
cated without any loss of substance is "pure thought and expres-
sion." That is, if the words, numbers, graphics, or pictures can
be photographically or electronically cloned, the publisher's
"product" is only the media, not the message. The thoughts and
expressions communicated are intangible and therein belong to
everyone, limited only by the laws of copyright.
An aeronautical chart may be easily photocopied. But aside
from the rights a publisher may have to prevent such infringe-
ment, a photocopy that communicates the same information as
the original chart is not, by any definition, the original pub-
lisher's product. In fact, all of the information on an aeronauti-
cal chart may be communicated verbally as well. But a verbal
communication of the information contained on an aeronauti-
cal chart is not a product either. Indeed, in Aetna, the Ninth
Circuit held that the publishers' product is the graphic depic-
tion of the words and numbers, not the words and numbers
themselves.7 0
In summary, three courts have interpreted the common law
of three states to find that aeronautical charts are products sub-
jecting the publisher to strict product liability for publication of
"defective" information. The Second Circuit interpreted Colo-
rado law in Saloomey; the Ninth Circuit interpreted Nevada law
in Aetna; and the California Supreme Court interpreted Califor-
nia law in Brocklesby. At that time, all three courts had adopted
the Restatement formulation of strict product liability. 7' Notwith-
standing the obvious focus of section 402A on the tangible
world, each court that imposed strict product liability on an aer-
onautical chart publisher resorted to the public policy originally
stated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. to justify its posi-
tion that information is a product.7 2
70 Id. at 342.
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
72 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962).
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VI. AERONAUTICAL CHARTS AS PRODUCTS UNDER
STATUTORY PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
To date, no court has considered whether an aeronautical
chart is a product under any product liability statute. When it
inevitably occurs, such an analysis will be very different from
those previous decisions based on common law. When a legisla-
ture has spoken, the courts are limited to interpreting the law
based on the rules of statutory construction, not based on their
common law power to make and change the law. The primary
issue will be legislative intent, not public policy. Indeed, the
only legislative intent likely in states where common law strict
product liability has been replaced by statutory product liability
is to limit the application of the law, not expand it. That is, in
every state where a product liability statute was enacted, it had
been under the rubric of tort reform. Thus, restrictive readings
of such statutes should be required.
To date, the United States Federal District Court of Connecti-
cut is the only court to interpret a product liability statute in
considering whether a publication is a product. In L. Cohen &
Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 3 the court was asked to consider
whether a credit report publication was a product under the
Connecticut Product Liability Act."4 First, the court considered the
definition of "product liability claim," i.e., "all claims or actions
brought for personal injury, death or property damage caused
by the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation,
assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing,
packaging, or labeling of any product." 5 Based on this defini-
tion, the court held that it "evinces no legislative intent to ex-
tend its coverage to reports, periodicals, books or other
writings" and that it "appears to reflect a legislative concern with
products of a more tangible nature."76 Moreover, the Connecti-
cut Product Liability Act, by its terms, was the exclusive remedy in
Connecticut for personal injury, death, or property damage
caused by a product. Therefore, if the legislature had intended
its scope to include published information, it would effectively
repeal the laws of defamation that also provide a remedy for
73 629 F. Supp. 1425 (D. Conn. 1986).
74 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 rn-n (1997).
75 Id. § 52-572 m(b).
76 L. Cohen Co., 629 F. Supp. at 1430.
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harm caused by published information. The court found it un-
likely that the legislature would have done SO. 7 7
Although Saloomey was also tried in Connecticut, the court ap-
plied Colorado law.78 Neither state had a product liability stat-
ute at the time of the accident, 1975. Colorado subsequently
passed its Product Liability Act 79 in 1977. This act, which codified,
modified, and supplemented Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A,8° defines a product liability action as "any action brought
against a manufacturer or seller of a product ... for or on ac-
count of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by
or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design,
formula, installation, preparation, assembly, testing, packaging,
labeling, or sale of any product.""' This definition, which is al-
most identical to the Connecticut definition, similarly "evinces
no legislative intent to extend its coverage to reports, periodi-
cals, books or other writings. '8 2 While these words can be used
in connection with the paper and binders for aeronautical
charts, they make no sense in describing the information com-
municated on the paper.
Nor does it make sense to suggest that the Colorado legisla-
ture intended by its Product Liability Act to replace the law of
defamation with strict product liability. That is, under defama-
tion law, a person may be held strictly liable for publication of a
defamatory falsehood."3 Under strict product liability law, how-
ever, the publisher of information that causes harm is strictly
liable, even if the publication is totally true and accurate. If Col-
orado's Product Liability Act were interpreted to include reports,
periodicals, books, and other writings, all authors and publish-
ers might be strictly liable for any harm they caused by any pub-
lication, whether accurate or not. Not only is this result not
what the legislature intended, it would surely run afoul of the
protection afforded by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 4
Without analyzing every state product liability statute, it is un-
likely that any such legislation could be interpreted to impose
77 See id.
78 Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
79 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-21-401 to 406 (West 1997).
80 See 7 MILLER, Colo. Pers. Inj. Prac. § 22.5 (1989).
81 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-401(2).
82 L. Cohen & Co., 629 F. Supp. at 1430.
83 Strict liability applies only to defamation of a private person.
84 See discussion infra Part VII.
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strict product liability on aeronautical chart publishers unless it
was drafted so narrowly that it covered aeronautical charts but
not other publications. Because no state statute to date ex-
pressly covers aeronautical charts, any court considering the is-
sue in a state where statutory strict product liability has replaced
common law strict product liability is unlikely to ever interpret
such a statute to include aeronautical charts.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
AERONAUTICAL CHART PUBLISHERS
To date, no court has considered whether aeronautical chart
publishers should be afforded the same protection as other pub-
lishers under the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.8" The First Amendment has been interpreted to protect
the publication of words and ideas from infringement by the
courts unless the speech in question falls into one of just a few
categories for which there is less than complete constitutional
protection.
The First Amendment, which states that Congress shall make
no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," ap-
plies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.8 6 It ap-
plies to product liability cases because the imposition of tort
liability constitutes state action. 7 Thus, the First Amendment
bars the imposition of civil liability on aeronautical chart pub-
lishers unless aeronautical charts fall within one of the well-de-
fined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are
unprotected by the First Amendment.88 These include: (1) ob-
scenity, 9 (2) fighting words,90  (3) libel,9 (4) commercial
85 In a footnote, Judge Cabranes said in L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet
Inc., "[t]he navigational charts thatJudge Eginton found in Halstead to be sub-
ject to the product liability laws, unlike the credit reports in the instant case, did
not constitute speech protected by the First Amendment." 629 F. Supp. at 1431
n.8. ButJudge Eginton said no such thing. In fact, he did not mention the First
Amendment at all. See Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn.
1982).
A footnote in Brocklesby v. United States also mentioned the First Amendment de-
fense but declined to consider it because it was raised for the first time on appeal.
767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9 (9th Cir. 1985).
86 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
87 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("The test is
not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.").
88 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
89 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
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speech,92 and (5) words likely to incite imminent, lawless
action."
Aeronautical charts do not fall into the obscenity, fighting
words, or libel categories, and are not commercial speech that
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction. '" 9' Com-
mercial speech may also communicate information for purposes
of inviting or enticing one to buy goods or services.95 Although
aeronautical charts are published for profit, they cannot be con-
sidered an effort to achieve the type of commercial result that
an advertisement is designed to achieve. Therefore, the aero-
nautical charts cannot be characterized as commercial speech.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, publishers can be held liable
for physical injury caused by their words. In Weirum v. RKO Gen-
eral, Inc., the court affirmed an award of damages to the plaintiff
in a wrongful death action against a radio station.96 The dece-
dent was negligently forced off a highway by a listener of defend-
ant's radio station, which was conducting a contest rewarding
the first contestant to locate a disc jockey traveling throughout
the listening area. The court rejected the station's First Amend-
ment defense, stating that "[d]efendant's contention that the
giveaway contest must be afforded the deference due society's
interest in the First Amendment is clearly without merit ...
The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physi-
cal injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act. 97
Weirum is distinguishable from aeronautical chart cases be-
cause the Weirum broadcasts actively and repeatedly encouraged
listeners to speed to announced locations. Liability was imposed
on the broadcaster for urging listeners to act in an inherently
dangerous manner. The same cannot be said for aeronautical
charts, which merely convey information. To the contrary, the
use of aeronautical charts encourages inherently safe and neces-
sary activities.
90 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
91 See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 267.
92 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
93 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
94 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973).
95 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (noting the informational function of commercial
speech).
96 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
97 Id. at 40.
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A publisher does not enjoy absolute immunity from tort liabil-
ity. The critical issue is whether the publication is protected by
the First Amendment.98 For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co., the Court held that the First Amendment
did not protect defendants from liability under the common-law
tort of "appropriation" or "right of publicity" when news media
filmed plaintiffs "human cannonball act at a county fair and
broadcast the act without the plaintiffs permission, reasoning
that it was enough that defendants knew that the plaintiff ob-
jected to the broadcast and went forward anyway.99 In Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., the Court held that the First Amendment does
not bar application of ordinary principles of state contract and
promissory estoppel law in a suit against a newspaper for breach-
ing its promise of confidentiality and printing a source's
name.0 0  Goldstein v. California upheld California's "record
piracy" law, noting that "no restraint has been placed on the use
of an idea or concept."' ' In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, the Court upheld a copyright infringement ac-
tion against The Nation magazine for printing excerpts from
President Gerald Ford's memoirs, holding that the First Amend-
ment did not shield the magazine from the normal principles of
copyright liability. 0 2 In Snepp v. United States, the Court upheld
a constructive trust on defendants' royalties for a book pub-
lished in violation of a preclearance agreement with the CIA. 103
Decisions against the publishers of Soldier of Fortune are also
distinguishable.0 4 The courts in those cases upheld actions for
damages against Soldier of Fortune magazine for deaths resulting
from the magazine's "gun for hire" advertisements. 10 5 The de-
fendants in these cases tried unsuccessfully to use the First
Amendment as a defense.'0 6 These cases are inapposite because
98 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982).
99 433 U.S. 562, 575-79 (1977).
100 501 U.S. 663, 667-72 (1991).
101 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973).
102 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
103 444 U.S. 507, 511-16 (1980).
104 See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (lth
Cir. 1992); Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397
(W.D. Ark. 1987).
105 See Braun, 968 F.2d at 1122; Nowood, 651 F. Supp. at 1403.
106 See Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116; Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1398.
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they involve commercial speech, which is afforded only limited
First Amendment protection. 10 7
A common thread running through most of the exceptions to
First Amendment protection is the concept of fault. In almost
every case in which liability has been imposed on the publisher
of information that causes harm, there has been a showing of
fault, either intentional or negligent. The only exceptions to
this rule of no strict liability are defamation of a private person
and infringement of intellectual property. Strict liability is im-
posed on a publisher of defamatory falsehood and one that in-
fringes a copyright.
In L. Cohen & Co., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the court
addressed the application of strict product liability on a
publisher:
The imposition of liability without fault on the publisher of a
credit report ... would be just a short step from the imposition
of liability without fault on an investigative reporter, a political
columnist or a documentary film maker. The constitutional con-
straints on the common law of defamation enunciated in New
York Times Company v. Sullivan,... and its progeny, would effec-
tively be nullified if writers, artists and publishers could be held
strictly liable for their work under the product liability laws.' °8
Another common thread running through many exceptions
to First Amendment protection is the lack of socially redeeming
value for the publication. Aeronautical charts, however, are ex-
tremely valuable to both safety and economic well-being and are
therefore worthy of First Amendment protection.
The United States has an extensive history of permitting the
free, open, and competitive dissemination of information and
ideas. This privilege (and concomitant shield against threats of
civil suits) has long been an integral part of the fabric of this
nation, and as such has been tenaciously protected by the
courts. As explained in an often quoted statement:
The constitutional protection accorded to the freedom of speech
and of the press is not based on the naive belief that speech can
do no harm but on the confidence that the benefits society reaps
from the free flow and exchange of ideas outweigh the costs soci-
ety endures by receiving reprehensible or dangerous ideas.10 9
107 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 384 (1973).
108 629 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (D. Conn. 1986).
- Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987).
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VIII. APPLICATION OF THE "ACT OF STATE" DOCTRINE
TO AERONAUTICAL CHARTS
Most of the information published on aeronautical charts is
promulgated by sovereign countries pursuant to their right to
control the airspace over their own territory, a right that is jeal-
ously guarded by all countries. As stated in Chapter 1 of the
Chicago Convention, "every State has complete and exclusive sov-
ereignty over the airspace above its territory.'"' In fact, despite
the efforts of the International Commercial Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO), no international standard has ever been adopted
to control or police sovereign air space."'
The "Act of State" doctrine is a judicially created doctrine of
restraint that precludes courts from reviewing the validity of a
foreign sovereign's public acts' 12 committed within its own terri-
tory." 3 The doctrine evolved to address three specific concerns:
(1) respect for foreign sovereigns; (2) separation of powers; and
(3) justiciability."' It was first applied in Underhill v. Hernandez
where the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by an
American citizen, Underhill, who sought damages for wrongful
110 Chicago Convention, supra note 16, at 1180.
1 See id. While the Chicago Convention and its annexes have the force of law
on each contracting state, pursuant to Articles 37 and 38, contracting states are
required only to secure the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regula-
tions, standards and procedures. Where a state finds it impractical to comply
with an international standard or procedure, or bring its own regulations in full
accord, that state must file a "difference" with ICAO. ICAO will in turn notify all
contracting states. But the Convention contains no enforcement mechanism or
procedure.
112 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 443 (1987) (defining public act as constitutional amendments, statutes, de-
crees, and proclamations, and in certain circumstances as physical acts; an official
government pronouncement describing a certain act as governmental is usually
conclusive evidence of its official character); see also Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F.
Supp. 538, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that the doctrine was limited to "laws,
decrees, decisions, seizures and other officially authorized 'public acts."'); Lynn
E. Parseghian, Note, Defining the "Public Act" Requirement in the Act of State Doctrine,
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1151, 1162 (1991) (stating that "the Court has said little about
what constitutes a public act, and the courts have scrutinized this at a threshold
level"); id. at 1165 (stating the more restrictive view requires the official to be
authorized to bind the state).
113 See Banco de Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964);
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
114 See Parseghian, supra note 112, at 1153. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR-
EIGN REIATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 (1987) (explaining that the
rationale for the doctrine has been described in various ways, and the weight
given to the different rationales may determine the possible limitations or
exceptions).
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imprisonment by a Venezuelan military leader. 15 Stating that
the doctrine recognizes the respect one sovereign state owes to
the independence of another state, the Court held that it would
not sit in judgment of the acts of another country.11 6
In the most often cited Act of State doctrine case, Banco de
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court applied the doctrine to
bar that suit against Cuba for the expropriation of U.S. owned
assets in Cuba."1 ' The Court explained that the doctrine arose
out of the relationship between different branches of government
in a system of separation of powers.1 8
In the most recent Supreme Court case that addresses the Act
of State doctrine, WS. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics, Jus-
tice Scalia stated "[t]he act of state doctrine does not establish
an exception for cases . . .that may embarrass foreign govern-
ments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the
acts of foreign sovereigns taken within ,their own jurisdictions
shall be deemed valid."'"19
At least one court found the Act of State doctrine to be appli-
cable to strict product liability. In Bynum v. FMC Corp., the
plaintiff, a member of the Mississippi National Guard who was
injured while operating a tracked army vehicle manufactured by
FMC, sought to hold FMC strictly liable for defects in the vehi-
cle.' 2° FMC asserted the government contractor's defense,
which protects a government contractor from liability if its prod-
uct was manufactured in accordance with government specifica-
tions.' 21 Comparing the government contractor defense to the
Act of State doctrine, the court said:
We find the present situation to be not unlike that of Banco Na-
cional v. Sabbatino .... At issue in Banco Nacional was the legal
basis and scope of the "act of state" doctrine, which precludes
judicial inquiry into the public acts of a recognized foreign sover-
eign power committed within its own territory. The Supreme
Court held that, because of the essential political nature of for-
eign expropriation and its significance in international affairs,
the basic relations between the judicial and political branches of
115 168 U.S. 250, 250-51 (1897).
116 See id. at 252.
117 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
I's See id. at 423.
19 493 U.S. 400, 410 (1990).
120 770 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1985).
121 See id.
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government required that the judiciary not pass on the validity of
the expropriations.1 22
Similarly, in Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., a case involving
strict product liability against an aeronautical chart publisher,
the court stated that foreign sovereigns' interest in regulating
their airspace outweighs any interest the United States may have
in applying its own air safety regulations. 23
Even concerning decisions of the United States government
with respect to regulation and control of its airspace, the courts
may not be competent to pass judgment. Like the Act of State
doctrine, this restriction could be justified on the basis of sepa-
ration of powers, but in fact it is based on sovereign immunity.
That is, the United States may not be sued for such decisions
because they are considered discretionary acts to which the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act waiver of sovereign immunity does not ap-
ply. In West v. FAA , the plaintiffs sued the United States for
allegedly designing a defective instrument departure procedure,
i.e., a flight procedure for leaving an airport during weather
conditions that make visual flight difficult or impossible. 121 In
finding that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA
applied, the court said:
FAA employees consider safety in exercising their judgment
whether to establish departure procedures for airports .... De-
termination of safety requirements involves a balancing of social,
economic or political policies. In any safety decision, there are
limits to the resources available to test and inspect the procedure
and those who will be using it ....
The FAA employees who were responsible for the design of the
departure procedures from Bishop Airport were given wide dis-
cretion. They were required to use their best judgment in decid-
ing what tests were necessary to meet reasonable safety
requirements. This required a balancing of social and economic
interests and a tailoring of safety requirements to local
conditions. 125
Every sovereign state must exercise judgment in establishing
flight procedures. Such judgment inevitably involves the balanc-
ing of safety against social, economic, and political policies and
reality. The Act of State doctrine is a judicial recognition that
122 Id. at 570.
12- 867 F. Supp. 525, 525-532 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
124 830 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1987).
125 Id. at 1047-49.
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such balancing cannot and should not be second guessed by the
courts.
The Act of State doctrine is particularly applicable to an ac-
tion against an aeronautical chart publisher that seeks to hold
the publisher strictly liable for "defects" in an accurately pub-
lished flight procedure. In order to find liability in such a case,
the court must necessarily rule on the validity of an act of state
committed within a sovereign's own territory. But such a ruling
would violate the Act of State doctrine. Accordingly, this doc-
trine should bar any action from strict liability against an aero-
nautical chart publisher based on a "defective" flight procedure
that was accurately published.
The Act of State doctrine also illustrates the invalidity of the
application of strict product liability to a flight procedure pub-
lished on an aeronautical chart. Whether a product is defective
or not inevitably involves a balancing test between the risks asso-
ciated with the use of the product and the benefits of its use.
The benefit of an instrument approach procedure is the ability
to land in adverse weather conditions. This benefit inures not
only to the user, but also to the sovereign state that designed
and promulgated the procedure. Instrument flight procedures
increase airport utilization and thus boost the airport's local and
national economy.
With respect to instrument approach procedures, there is an
inverse relationship between safety and utilization-the safer
the procedure, the less useful, and vice versa. For example,
every instrument approach procedure has a minimum altitude
to which the aircraft may descend before it must either have the
airport in sight or abandon the approach. The higher the mini-
mum altitude, the safer the instrument approach procedure.
However, as the minimum altitude is increased, the number of
abandoned approaches also increases, thus decreasing the
number of landings. The safest instrument approach procedure
is one that requires visual contact with the airport at a high alti-
tude. But the safest instrument approach procedure would not
be a very useful instrument approach procedure. Accordingly,
instrument approach procedure design involves judgment deci-
sions and compromises that are quite different from product de-
sign decisions and not appropriate for second guessing by a
court.
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IX. CONCLUSION
While several courts have found that aeronautical chart pub-
lishers are strictly liable for injuries caused by publication of "de-
fective" information, those decisions are flawed in many
respects. To date, however, no court has considered whether
any strict product liability statute applies to aeronautical chart
publishers. If and when such a case arises, it is unlikely that any
statute that does not expressly single out aeronautical charts will
be interpreted to apply to all publications. Such an interpreta-
tion would run afoul of defamation laws and the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, it is likely
that strict product liability for aeronautical chart publishers is
barred by either the First Amendment or the Act of State
doctrine.
